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重大工程工厂化预制情形下,业主不同时期对工厂化预制商生产质量和工期的关注存在差异化。基于此,本文构建了业主对工厂化预制商的动态激励模型,分两阶段调整控制目标的激励强度,探讨工厂化预制商的特征对整体激励效果的影响,给出业主的最优激励策略及算例分析。研究表明,两阶段动态协调激励更贴近工厂化预制需求,业主通过两阶段动态激励契约降低了合作双方的信息不对称,促使工厂化预制商在工期-质量目标上合理分配努力水平和资源,不仅实现控制目标的协调均衡,也实现合作双方净收益的帕累托改善。
In the case of prefabrication of major projects in factories, there are differences in the owners’ concerns regarding the quality and duration of the works of prefabricated factories in different periods. Based on this, this paper constructs the dynamic incentive model for industrial prefabricators, and adjusts the incentive intensity of control objectives in two phases to discuss the impact of factory prefabricators on the overall incentive effects, and gives the optimal incentive strategy and Case study. The research shows that the two-stage dynamic coordination incentive is closer to the factory prefabricated demand. The owners reduce the information asymmetry between the two partners through two-stage dynamic incentive contract, and promote the prefabricated factory to rationally allocate the level of effort and resources on the duration-quality objectives. Achieve a balanced and balanced control objectives and improve the Pareto net income of both parties.