既有关于军事编遣的研究较多关注高层政治,如蒋对冯、阎、李等杂牌军的处置,对各大杂牌军下各部之生存状态则关注较少,且缺乏蒋与他们之间的互动研究,更缺乏对某一支军队在军事编遣期间的来龙去脉研究。本文以蒋介石对新编第五师的整编为中心,力求解释军事编遣的复杂性。缕析这一过程,新五师的整编与蒋介石处置西北军有着重要联系。从蒋介石赋予新五师甲种师编制,到新五师叛蒋,再到蒋介石与陈诚围绕整编发生分歧,以及最后将新五师进行鄂陕分治,我们不难发现,蒋在整编过程中一直徘徊于“急进”和“缓图”的方策之间,这也导致其整编效果难言成功,且蒋欲以其黄埔毕业生为主体的政工系统对杂牌军进行“组织”上和“思想”上的改造策略亦告失败。 Both the research on military maneuvers has paid more attention to high-level politics. For example, Jiang’s handling of such militiamen as Feng, Yan and Li has paid little attention to the subsistence status of various subordinate military departments and lacks the gap between Chiang and them Of the interactive research, but also the lack of a certain army during the military establishment of the ins and outs of the study. This article takes Chiang Kai-shek’s reorganization of the new fifth division as the center, trying to explain the complexity of the military establishment. To analyze this process, the reorganization of the new five divisions has an important connection with the disposal of the Northwest Army by Chiang Kai-shek. From Chiang Kai-shek to the new five division A seed division preparation, to the new five division rebel Chiang, then Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng around the reorganization of the division, and finally the new five divisions of Hubei and Shaanxi, we can easily find that Chiang in the reorganization process Has been hovering between the “radical” and “slow map” policy between the policy, which also led to its reorganization effect can hardly be successful, and Jiang Yu with its Whampoa graduates as the main political system for the brand army “organization ”And “ thinking ”on the reform strategy also failed.