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本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型,探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场(mixed oligopoly)中,国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响。研究结果表明:无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标,其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高,政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比。与最近的其他研究发现不同,在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时,收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率。同时本文还得出,福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大于关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例。因此,以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业。
In this paper, by constructing a game model of duopoly competition, we discuss the effect of product differentiation degree and degree of privatization of public enterprises on the optimal tariff in mixed oligopoly with product differentiation. The results show that no matter whether the government is aiming at maximizing income or maximizing welfare, the tariff rate should be increased with the degree of privatization and product differentiation. Both the goal of government welfare and the goal of tariff revenue are related to the product The degree of difference is proportional. Unlike other recent findings, when the privatization is absent or when the degree of privatization is relatively low and the degree of difference is relatively high, the tax rate of income maximization is always higher than the tariff rate of welfare maximization. At the same time, this article also draws the conclusion that the optimal proportion of privatization in society under welfare maximization is always greater than the optimal proportion of privatization in society that maximizes the revenue from taxes. Therefore, the government aiming at the maximization of social welfare is more likely to privatize the public-owned enterprises in the country than those targeting the maximization of tariff revenues.