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本文考虑具有时间不一致性偏好的企业管理者的最优分红策略.假定企业盈余资金由一般扩散模型描述,管理者的偏好由准双曲贴现函数刻画,目标是最大化破产前的累积红利现值.基于管理者对自己未来偏好的认识,分别考虑幼稚型和成熟型管理者的最优分红策略.首先利用随机最优控制方法,得到了两类管理者优化问题的HJB方程及验证定理.然后以常系数扩散模型为例,得到幼稚型与成熟型管理者的最优分红策略及最优值函数的解析式,并对分红策略进行了敏感性分析.结果表明常系数扩散模型下具有时间不一致性偏好的管理者倾向于提前分红,其中成熟型管理者比幼稚型管理者更倾向于发放红利;此外,通过对幼稚型与成熟型管理者施加合适的破产惩罚,可使得幼稚型与成熟型管理者的最优策略与无破产惩罚的时间一致性偏好管理者的最优策略相同.
In this paper, we consider the optimal dividend strategy of managers who have the preference of time inconsistency. Assuming that corporate earnings funds are described by the general diffusion model, managers’ preferences are described by the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function with the objective of maximizing the present value of the cumulative dividend before bankruptcy Based on the managers ’understanding of their own future preferences, the author separately considers the optimal dividend strategy of naive and mature managers.Firstly, using the stochastic optimal control method, we obtain the HJB equation and the verification theorem of two types of managers’ optimization problems. Taking the constant coefficient diffusion model as an example, the optimal dividend strategy and the optimal value function of the naive and mature managers are obtained, and the sensitivity analysis of the dividend payout strategy is carried out. The results show that there are inconsistent time under the constant coefficient diffusion model Sex preference managers tend to dividend early, of which mature managers tend to pay dividends more than naive managers; in addition, by imposing appropriate bankruptcy penalties on both naive and mature managers, naive and mature The optimal strategy for managers is the same as the optimal strategy for preference-free managers for the time consistency of non-bankruptcy punishment.