股东投票成本的非均匀分布和集体决策上的多数票规则 ,激励了中小股东的“搭便车”行为 ,从而使大股东和公司高层管理人员获取了因信息不对称而产生的巨大信息租。本文研究表明 ,信息租的存在 ,从根本上破坏了同股同权、同股同利的股票分配原则 ,导致公司股东在权利和责任上的不对称分布。文章的分析将对中国的公司治理及证券市场的发展具有一定的理论研究和实践指导价值。 The non-uniform distribution of shareholders’ voting costs and the majority vote rules in collective decision-making have motivated the small and medium-sized shareholders to “free ride” so that the major shareholders and the top management of the company can obtain huge information rent due to the asymmetric information. This study shows that the existence of information rent fundamentally undermines the principle of stock distribution with the same rights and same interests in the same shares, resulting in the asymmetric distribution of rights and responsibilities of shareholders. The analysis of the article will have some theoretical and practical guiding value for the development of corporate governance and securities market in China.