Between 2008 and 2020 there has been a significant growth of M＆A deals conducted by Boutique Financial Advisors,driven by manifold factors which are explained in this research.This thesis draws its basis from the research previously conducted by Song et al.and Faber,with the aim of demonstrating whether the results obtained from the previous literature,which were mainly focused on the American market,are also valid in the main European Countries（Italy,Spain,U.K.,France,Germany and Poland）.Specifically,the thesis shows according to which criteria the merged firms choose a Boutique advisor rather than a fullservice Investment Bank in order to conclude an M＆A deal.The research identifies 120 deals advised by boutique banks from a large sample of 250 M＆A transactions occurred in the last decade（2010-2020）.Using a total of five multivariate regressions and through the conduction of three open-ended interviews with Professional Bankers,it is found that boutique advisors are more likely to be chosen as financial advisors in simpler transactions,therefore opposing to the Song et al.’s and Faber’s findings,and that,in these transaction scenarios,boutiques generate a higher positive impact on deal outcomes than investment banks or mixed advisory teams;moreover,these positive effects generated by boutique advisors on deal outcomes are more remarkable on the target side rather than on the buyer side.Conversely,investment banks and mixed advisory teams are more likely to be involved in complex and larger deals,since they benefit from a higher reputation effect,compared to smaller and independent investment banks.Additionally,the analysis conducted in this thesis demonstrates that higher termination fees are detrimental for the deal premium,and therefore such clauses are more likely to increase the conflict of interests between the merged firms involved in the transaction.Overall,no statistical evidence can be made regarding the impact of investment banks vs.boutiques towards bidder and target shareholders’ wealth.