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【摘要】本篇论文从各超级大国在朝鲜战争中行为的五个层面来分析它们之间的猜疑和误算，即美国高估了斯大林对战争的热衷、斯大林错误估计朝鲜半岛危机中美国的反应、美国低估了中国人民保卫祖国的决心、美国作出越过三八线这一错误决定以及其对中苏关系的误解。
【关键词】朝鲜战争 猜疑 误算 可避免的
An Avoidable War
------An analysis of distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers in the korean war
Liu Kehong
【Abstract】This paper will analyze the distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers in the Korean War. It will provide five aspects of the superpowers’ conduct of the war. At each level, issues such as America’s overestimation about Stalin’s enthusiam of the war, Stalin’s miscalculations of American’s response of the peninsula crisis, Amrica’s underestimation of Chinese determination to safeguard their mother country, U.S.’s decision to advance beyond the 38th parallel, America’s misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship will be considered.
【Keywords】Korean War Distrust Miscalculation Avoidable
1．Introduction
Korean War, one of the most destructive conflicts in the 20th century, has left a number of myths to us. Some people say it is a meaningless war, for it ended without a formal peace. The territorial settlement was much the same as at the beginning. But the dams lay gaping; the fertile land was drowned; the hills were seared and blasted; and the corpses piled up, parching under the sunshine. Was the war avoidable? Who was to blame? Was China’s sacrifice worthwhile? Whenever talking about this war, I cannot help thinking about the said questions. It is very hard to say which side should be responsible for starting the war. But one thing is for certain. The Korean War was largely based on the distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers.
2．America’s overestimation about Stalin’s enthusiam of the war
One of the most important theories behind the USA and Soviet Union’s involvement in the Korean War must be the balance of power. After the Second World War, the USA and the Soviet Union were the two remaining truly great powers. Their interest began to clash as each wanted to assert its influence over the postwar world. “This competition had a deep ideological tone” (Malkasian, 2001: 1). The States and its allies promoted democracy and capitalism while the Soviet Union and its Communist colleagues sought to expand Communism. The Soviet Union was obviously the most threatening power in Korea. America was resolved to contain Russian influence and prevent threats to peace and independence of other nations in the Capitalist camp. Judging from Stalin’s ambitions, the Americans believed that their opponent aimed to global Communist expansion and world domination. “The tale of the Korean War fits the myth of global Communist expansionism and American determination to contain it on behalf of the democratic freedom” (Inglis: 76). It was taken for granted that Stalin was challenging the Western allies through his stooge Kim II-Sung. Unfortunately, Stalin’s ambitions were somewhat exaggerated by the Americans’ notorious imagination. America-Russian relations were bad but Stalin had no intention of involving the Soviet Union deeply in the peninsula’s problems. “This is borne out by his decision, evidently taken about a week after the Korean War began, to pull out Russian pilots and other advisers from North Korea so as to minimize the dangers of Soviet commitment” (Paterson: 428). Stalin put more focus on the European affairs and only wished to set a steady relationship with America at that difficult time. The Second World War just left the Soviet Union a virtually ruined country. Stalin normally preferred to avoid any large and direct conflict with America, let alone a diversionary war. His cautious international policy determined that the peninsula’s affaires could not become his priority, Korea’s importance notwithstanding. The American decision makers subjectively magnified the Soviet Union’s enthusiasm about starting the war, which escalated their emphasis on the war and finally made them deeply trapped by it.
3．Stalin’s miscalculations of American’s response of the peninsula crisis
In the position of Stalin, on one hand, he would by no means wish to see North Korea fall into the hands of the Capitalist camp. On the other hand, he did not wish to combat with America, at least not directly. In the first years after the Second World War, whenever possible, he avoided direct conflict with the United States. Although Kim Il-sung insisted that the unification of the peninsula had to be realized through military means, Stalin preferred to solve the Korean issue in a peaceful manner. In early 1950, however, he suddenly approved North Korean leader Kim’s proposal for invading South Korea. His sudden and dramatic transformation toward Korea at that time has remained as a mystery. One plausible explanation can be found in the shifting U.S. attitude towards Korea and Taiwan. On 12 January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a major speech. He defined the American defense perimeter in Asia, which excluded Korea. Some people criticized that this omission gave the Soviet Union the incentive to use its North Korean allies to attack South Korea. This charge did make some sense. “V. P. Tkachenko, head of the Korean Affairs Division of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, recalled that Stalin was impressed with Acheson’s speech after he had studied it carefully” (Grayson: 21). It seemed that America was retreating from East Asia. Stalin felt free to do as he wished in Korea, since the Soviet leaders assumed the United States was not interested in the peninsula issue. Just as Douglas MacArthur underestimated the likelihood of Chinese intervention, Stalin miscalculated America’s rapid response of dispatching military forces to aid South Korea. This miscalculation finally made him approve Kim Il-sung’ military plan.
4．America’s underestimation of Chinese determination to safeguard their mother country
For many years, a lot of historians have grappled with China’s intervention in the Korea War. Why did it intervene? Many observers in 1950 thought it foolhardy for this young and underdeveloped nation to engage in another war, let alone fight against such a super and nuclear-armed opponent on foreign fields. In fact, the Chinese leaders by no means had motive to unleash a war in Korea at first. The newly founded Communist nation needed to devote more of its energy to deal with the internal and external crisis rather than foster a Korean clash. Furthermore, “Kim II-Sung was identified with a pro-Russian stance rather that one sympathetic to China and Mao Zedong would hardly benefit from strengthening Kim’s authority” (Paterson: 429). Therefore, for a long time before the war, the Chinese leader displayed a cautious and conservative manner in regard to Kim’s war plan. However, Mao’s altitude towards Kim’s military plan shifted as the America-led UN forces marched beyond the 38th parallel. It was natural for Mao to regard that the U.S. was testing the nerve of the newly established Communist country by threatening its border security. To make things worse, President Truman even sent the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan. This time the Chinese leader could no longer stay calm. It seemed to Mao at that time he had every reason to interfere in the peninsula crisis. And Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet to safeguard the island broke his promise that he would not involve in China’s internal affairs, which reminded Mao Zedong that America might violate China’s territory. It followed that the Chinese leader immediately sent a huge number of “volunteers” to the battlefields. “Fueled by Mao’s call to safeguard China and East Asia from American invasions, the Chinese showed how a relatively poor-equipped but inspired fighting force could deprive a technologically superior opponent of victory in a limited war” (Fehrenbach, 1994: 47). Again the American decision-makers underestimated the Chinese people’s determination to defend their mother country even if they were expected to fight against the number one superpower of the world.
5．U.S.’s decision to advance beyond the 38th parallel
We can learn from above that China would probably not intervene the Korean War if the America-led UN forces had not advance beyond the 38th parallel. Then why America was determined to cross the line? What would happen if they didn’t do so? As a matter of fact, the United States had opportunity to avoid a full-scale war with China. However, advancing beyond the 38th parallel changed everything. Before China sent its troops to North Korea, the Chinese government sent several signals to warn the United States that China would not stand up by if the American troops cross the line. Unfortunately the American leaders didn’t take it seriously. Convinced that the Russians would dare not risk fighting against the American troops in the peninsula, they took it for granted that the Chinese would follow suit for the sake of Mao’s “lean-to-one-side” policy. And it could also be logically argued that it was most unlikely for this poor and weak Communist country to engage in yet another war after so many years’ fighting against the National Party. The American leaders paid much attention to the Russians’ attitude towards the Korea issue yet they were simply indifferent to China’s response. Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. general who was famous for his arrogance and aggressiveness also contributed to America’s decision to cross the 38th parallel. It was him who promised to President Truman that there was little chance for Chinese interference. He declared, “We are no longer fearful of their (Chinese) intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand…if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter…We are the best” (Paterson: 406). Some American military leaders were initially not so confident as their colleague. “They were quite fearful of widening the war and opposed consideration of offensive action north of the thirty-eighth parallel” (438). Yet MacArthur’s successful landing on Inchon forced them to reconsider their position. Americans suffered from exaggerated optimism after the general’s success in the peninsula. More and more people began to believe that a decisive victory was within easy grasp if the troops would cross the 38th parallel. Unfortunately they not only crossed it, but advanced toward the Chinese border, which ultimately brought China into the war. China believed that America intended to violate its territory yet “crossing the thirty-eighth parallel was then only the prelude to the fulfillment of Truman’s plan for victory in Korea and around the globe” (Paterson: 445). No available evidence could indicate that America’s crossing the line signals its intention to invade China. If the United States had halted at the 38th parallel, the Korean War would probably not escalate into such a destructive war in which both sides suffered great losses.
6．America’s misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship
Another miscalculation made by the Americans was that they overestimated the loyalty between China and the Soviet Union. Scholars have often argued that the establishment of the new China and the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance positively affected Stalin’s assessment of the balance of power in Asia and gave him the confidence to confront the United States in Asia. But it could also be logically argued that Stalin perceived the rise of the CCP as a potential threat to Soviet dominance of the international Communist movement. “For Stalin, the success of the CCP was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enlarged the Soviet Union’s buffer zone and preserved Communist influence in Asia. On the other hand, once it gained military strength, China had the potential to become a rival power in the East” (Malkasian: 9). When it came to the peninsula crisis, Stalin did not discuss the matter directly with Mao, but rather with Kim Il Sung. He asked Kim to tell Mao of the decision to go to war against the South Korea while he himself would rather hide behind the curtain, playing the role of a director. Faced with this fait accompli, Mao could only acquiesce. Apparently Stalin did not trust Mao and the rife between China and the Soviet Union had already existed before the Korea War. “In spite of their ideology, the Chinese Communists did not have close ties with the Soviet Union during the Chinese Civil War. Stalin was not forthcoming with military assistance of political support. He had even signed a treaty with the Nationalists” (Malkasian: 14). If the American decision-makers had known that the Chinese were trying hard to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S and that they only took action when their security was under direct threat rather than follow the Soviet Union’s conduction, probably the American’s response and strategy toward the peninsula would be quite different.
7．Conclusion
The Korean War was a sad, tragic war that ended just about where it began. Then why did it occur? Actually responsibility for the outbreak and escalation of the war has to be widely shared. The basis of the Korean War not only was the miscalculation of the United Sates, the Soviet Union and China but also was fostered by mutual distrust of the superpowers. This war bore a deep ideological tone, which made the superpowers adopt improper strategies in dealing with the international relationship between them. Their mutual suspicions and misallocation ultimately brought themselves into the peninsula struggle. There were all victims of their lack of communication and understanding of each other. At the end of the war, China, the U.S. and the Koreas all suffered huge prices, which could be possibly avoided. Just as Fred Inglis said, “the Second World War has barely touched Korea. That omission had been corrected.”
References
1 Benson Lee Grayson, ed. The American Image of China: A History Of Sino-American Relations. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.
2 Thomas G.Paterson, ed. Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Volume II: Since 1914.Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company.
3 Fred Inglis. The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War. A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, Inc.
4 Carter Malkasian. The Korean War 1950-1953. Osprey Publishing (UK), 2001
5 T.R.Fehrenhach. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. Brassey’s; Reprint edition, 1994.
【关键词】朝鲜战争 猜疑 误算 可避免的
An Avoidable War
------An analysis of distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers in the korean war
Liu Kehong
【Abstract】This paper will analyze the distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers in the Korean War. It will provide five aspects of the superpowers’ conduct of the war. At each level, issues such as America’s overestimation about Stalin’s enthusiam of the war, Stalin’s miscalculations of American’s response of the peninsula crisis, Amrica’s underestimation of Chinese determination to safeguard their mother country, U.S.’s decision to advance beyond the 38th parallel, America’s misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship will be considered.
【Keywords】Korean War Distrust Miscalculation Avoidable
1．Introduction
Korean War, one of the most destructive conflicts in the 20th century, has left a number of myths to us. Some people say it is a meaningless war, for it ended without a formal peace. The territorial settlement was much the same as at the beginning. But the dams lay gaping; the fertile land was drowned; the hills were seared and blasted; and the corpses piled up, parching under the sunshine. Was the war avoidable? Who was to blame? Was China’s sacrifice worthwhile? Whenever talking about this war, I cannot help thinking about the said questions. It is very hard to say which side should be responsible for starting the war. But one thing is for certain. The Korean War was largely based on the distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers.
2．America’s overestimation about Stalin’s enthusiam of the war
One of the most important theories behind the USA and Soviet Union’s involvement in the Korean War must be the balance of power. After the Second World War, the USA and the Soviet Union were the two remaining truly great powers. Their interest began to clash as each wanted to assert its influence over the postwar world. “This competition had a deep ideological tone” (Malkasian, 2001: 1). The States and its allies promoted democracy and capitalism while the Soviet Union and its Communist colleagues sought to expand Communism. The Soviet Union was obviously the most threatening power in Korea. America was resolved to contain Russian influence and prevent threats to peace and independence of other nations in the Capitalist camp. Judging from Stalin’s ambitions, the Americans believed that their opponent aimed to global Communist expansion and world domination. “The tale of the Korean War fits the myth of global Communist expansionism and American determination to contain it on behalf of the democratic freedom” (Inglis: 76). It was taken for granted that Stalin was challenging the Western allies through his stooge Kim II-Sung. Unfortunately, Stalin’s ambitions were somewhat exaggerated by the Americans’ notorious imagination. America-Russian relations were bad but Stalin had no intention of involving the Soviet Union deeply in the peninsula’s problems. “This is borne out by his decision, evidently taken about a week after the Korean War began, to pull out Russian pilots and other advisers from North Korea so as to minimize the dangers of Soviet commitment” (Paterson: 428). Stalin put more focus on the European affairs and only wished to set a steady relationship with America at that difficult time. The Second World War just left the Soviet Union a virtually ruined country. Stalin normally preferred to avoid any large and direct conflict with America, let alone a diversionary war. His cautious international policy determined that the peninsula’s affaires could not become his priority, Korea’s importance notwithstanding. The American decision makers subjectively magnified the Soviet Union’s enthusiasm about starting the war, which escalated their emphasis on the war and finally made them deeply trapped by it.
3．Stalin’s miscalculations of American’s response of the peninsula crisis
In the position of Stalin, on one hand, he would by no means wish to see North Korea fall into the hands of the Capitalist camp. On the other hand, he did not wish to combat with America, at least not directly. In the first years after the Second World War, whenever possible, he avoided direct conflict with the United States. Although Kim Il-sung insisted that the unification of the peninsula had to be realized through military means, Stalin preferred to solve the Korean issue in a peaceful manner. In early 1950, however, he suddenly approved North Korean leader Kim’s proposal for invading South Korea. His sudden and dramatic transformation toward Korea at that time has remained as a mystery. One plausible explanation can be found in the shifting U.S. attitude towards Korea and Taiwan. On 12 January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a major speech. He defined the American defense perimeter in Asia, which excluded Korea. Some people criticized that this omission gave the Soviet Union the incentive to use its North Korean allies to attack South Korea. This charge did make some sense. “V. P. Tkachenko, head of the Korean Affairs Division of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, recalled that Stalin was impressed with Acheson’s speech after he had studied it carefully” (Grayson: 21). It seemed that America was retreating from East Asia. Stalin felt free to do as he wished in Korea, since the Soviet leaders assumed the United States was not interested in the peninsula issue. Just as Douglas MacArthur underestimated the likelihood of Chinese intervention, Stalin miscalculated America’s rapid response of dispatching military forces to aid South Korea. This miscalculation finally made him approve Kim Il-sung’ military plan.
4．America’s underestimation of Chinese determination to safeguard their mother country
For many years, a lot of historians have grappled with China’s intervention in the Korea War. Why did it intervene? Many observers in 1950 thought it foolhardy for this young and underdeveloped nation to engage in another war, let alone fight against such a super and nuclear-armed opponent on foreign fields. In fact, the Chinese leaders by no means had motive to unleash a war in Korea at first. The newly founded Communist nation needed to devote more of its energy to deal with the internal and external crisis rather than foster a Korean clash. Furthermore, “Kim II-Sung was identified with a pro-Russian stance rather that one sympathetic to China and Mao Zedong would hardly benefit from strengthening Kim’s authority” (Paterson: 429). Therefore, for a long time before the war, the Chinese leader displayed a cautious and conservative manner in regard to Kim’s war plan. However, Mao’s altitude towards Kim’s military plan shifted as the America-led UN forces marched beyond the 38th parallel. It was natural for Mao to regard that the U.S. was testing the nerve of the newly established Communist country by threatening its border security. To make things worse, President Truman even sent the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan. This time the Chinese leader could no longer stay calm. It seemed to Mao at that time he had every reason to interfere in the peninsula crisis. And Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet to safeguard the island broke his promise that he would not involve in China’s internal affairs, which reminded Mao Zedong that America might violate China’s territory. It followed that the Chinese leader immediately sent a huge number of “volunteers” to the battlefields. “Fueled by Mao’s call to safeguard China and East Asia from American invasions, the Chinese showed how a relatively poor-equipped but inspired fighting force could deprive a technologically superior opponent of victory in a limited war” (Fehrenbach, 1994: 47). Again the American decision-makers underestimated the Chinese people’s determination to defend their mother country even if they were expected to fight against the number one superpower of the world.
5．U.S.’s decision to advance beyond the 38th parallel
We can learn from above that China would probably not intervene the Korean War if the America-led UN forces had not advance beyond the 38th parallel. Then why America was determined to cross the line? What would happen if they didn’t do so? As a matter of fact, the United States had opportunity to avoid a full-scale war with China. However, advancing beyond the 38th parallel changed everything. Before China sent its troops to North Korea, the Chinese government sent several signals to warn the United States that China would not stand up by if the American troops cross the line. Unfortunately the American leaders didn’t take it seriously. Convinced that the Russians would dare not risk fighting against the American troops in the peninsula, they took it for granted that the Chinese would follow suit for the sake of Mao’s “lean-to-one-side” policy. And it could also be logically argued that it was most unlikely for this poor and weak Communist country to engage in yet another war after so many years’ fighting against the National Party. The American leaders paid much attention to the Russians’ attitude towards the Korea issue yet they were simply indifferent to China’s response. Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. general who was famous for his arrogance and aggressiveness also contributed to America’s decision to cross the 38th parallel. It was him who promised to President Truman that there was little chance for Chinese interference. He declared, “We are no longer fearful of their (Chinese) intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand…if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter…We are the best” (Paterson: 406). Some American military leaders were initially not so confident as their colleague. “They were quite fearful of widening the war and opposed consideration of offensive action north of the thirty-eighth parallel” (438). Yet MacArthur’s successful landing on Inchon forced them to reconsider their position. Americans suffered from exaggerated optimism after the general’s success in the peninsula. More and more people began to believe that a decisive victory was within easy grasp if the troops would cross the 38th parallel. Unfortunately they not only crossed it, but advanced toward the Chinese border, which ultimately brought China into the war. China believed that America intended to violate its territory yet “crossing the thirty-eighth parallel was then only the prelude to the fulfillment of Truman’s plan for victory in Korea and around the globe” (Paterson: 445). No available evidence could indicate that America’s crossing the line signals its intention to invade China. If the United States had halted at the 38th parallel, the Korean War would probably not escalate into such a destructive war in which both sides suffered great losses.
6．America’s misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship
Another miscalculation made by the Americans was that they overestimated the loyalty between China and the Soviet Union. Scholars have often argued that the establishment of the new China and the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance positively affected Stalin’s assessment of the balance of power in Asia and gave him the confidence to confront the United States in Asia. But it could also be logically argued that Stalin perceived the rise of the CCP as a potential threat to Soviet dominance of the international Communist movement. “For Stalin, the success of the CCP was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enlarged the Soviet Union’s buffer zone and preserved Communist influence in Asia. On the other hand, once it gained military strength, China had the potential to become a rival power in the East” (Malkasian: 9). When it came to the peninsula crisis, Stalin did not discuss the matter directly with Mao, but rather with Kim Il Sung. He asked Kim to tell Mao of the decision to go to war against the South Korea while he himself would rather hide behind the curtain, playing the role of a director. Faced with this fait accompli, Mao could only acquiesce. Apparently Stalin did not trust Mao and the rife between China and the Soviet Union had already existed before the Korea War. “In spite of their ideology, the Chinese Communists did not have close ties with the Soviet Union during the Chinese Civil War. Stalin was not forthcoming with military assistance of political support. He had even signed a treaty with the Nationalists” (Malkasian: 14). If the American decision-makers had known that the Chinese were trying hard to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S and that they only took action when their security was under direct threat rather than follow the Soviet Union’s conduction, probably the American’s response and strategy toward the peninsula would be quite different.
7．Conclusion
The Korean War was a sad, tragic war that ended just about where it began. Then why did it occur? Actually responsibility for the outbreak and escalation of the war has to be widely shared. The basis of the Korean War not only was the miscalculation of the United Sates, the Soviet Union and China but also was fostered by mutual distrust of the superpowers. This war bore a deep ideological tone, which made the superpowers adopt improper strategies in dealing with the international relationship between them. Their mutual suspicions and misallocation ultimately brought themselves into the peninsula struggle. There were all victims of their lack of communication and understanding of each other. At the end of the war, China, the U.S. and the Koreas all suffered huge prices, which could be possibly avoided. Just as Fred Inglis said, “the Second World War has barely touched Korea. That omission had been corrected.”
References
1 Benson Lee Grayson, ed. The American Image of China: A History Of Sino-American Relations. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.
2 Thomas G.Paterson, ed. Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Volume II: Since 1914.Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company.
3 Fred Inglis. The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War. A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, Inc.
4 Carter Malkasian. The Korean War 1950-1953. Osprey Publishing (UK), 2001
5 T.R.Fehrenhach. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. Brassey’s; Reprint edition, 1994.