法律理论所需要解决的一个核心问题即是规范性。从奥斯丁开始的命令理论,直到哈特敏锐的发现奥斯丁理论中规范性的缺失,以及哈特理论之后的英美法理学再一次兴起,对于这一系列争论的理清,往往限于“规范性”语词本身的抽象而显得粗糙。文章旨在借由理由这一基本概念,对于哈特的理论进行分析,从而展现其在理论史中的地位,并进一步明确规范性在争论中起到的线索作用。 One of the core issues to be solved by legal theory is normative. From Austin’s command theory until Hart’s keen discovery of normative deficiencies in Austin’s theory and Anglo-American jurisprudence after Hart’s theory arises again, the clarification of this series of arguments is often limited to The abstraction of the “normative” word itself appears to be rough. The article aims to use the basic concept of reason to analyze Hart’s theory to show its position in the history of theory and to further clarify the clues that normative play in the debate.