本文运用声誉博弈模型分析分析师信息披露的策略行为,解释分析师信息披露偏差的现象。由于投资者无法确认分析师所披露的信息的质量,只能根据自己的先验信念及分析师披露的信息推断分析师的声誉类型,分析师为提高自己的声誉会披露迎合投资者先验信念的有偏信息。当分析师的先验声誉越差、信念越乐观、能力越低或者投资者的先验信念越乐观、获得信息反馈的概率越低时,分析师采用迎合策略披露信息迎合投资者的可能性越强,信息出现偏差的可能性越大。 This paper uses the reputation game model to analyze the analyst’s strategic behavior of information disclosure and explain the phenomenon of analyst’s information disclosure bias. Because investors can not confirm the quality of the information disclosed by analysts, they can only infer the analyst’s reputation based on his or her own prior beliefs and analysts ’disclosures. Analysts, in order to enhance their reputation, will be disclosed to cater to investors’ prior beliefs Biased information. When the analyst’s worse a priori reputation, the more optimistic the beliefs, the lower the ability or the more optimistic the investor’s prior beliefs, the lower the probability of receiving information feedback, the more analysts are likely to cater to investors by cater to strategy disclosure information Strong, the greater the possibility of deviation of the information.