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【Abstract】In the past three decades， there were quite a few intrastate conflicts in the world. As a powerful regional organization， NATO plays a vital role in the process of conflict intervention. However， in different cases， it may perform rather diversely. This essay explores the role of NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda cases， in an attempt to find a reasonable strategy for some complicated intrastate conflicts.
【Key words】NATO； intrastate conflict； military intervention
1. Introduction
It has been proved that， since the end of 1980s， a vast majority of armed conflicts all over the world have been intrastate rather than interstate conflicts. Among a wide range of intrastate conflicts， the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda attract much attention. This essay takes an overview of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict， and soon turns to the reactions NATO （the North Atlantic Treaty Organization）. Then， it intends to explore the role of NATO when it manages， settles， or prevents the intrastate conflicts. A brief introduction of the Rwanda tragedy will be put in the following context. At last， it will do certain comparison concerning the two cases and NATO， so as to find a possible solution for intrastate conflict intervention.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict
Bosnia-Herzegovina， a member state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia， held a referendum on independence in 1992 （Paris， 2004：97）. The three major ethnic groups， the Muslims， Croats， and Serbs， did not reach an agreement on Bosnia’s independence：the first two groups strongly favored it， while the last group intensely opposed it. When the Serbs boycotting the referendum， most of the valid votes were for independence and corresponding resolution was approved （Lobell and Mauceri， 2004：27）. Consequently， the conflict among these groups developed into a civil war. At the beginning， the Croats and Muslims pulled together to fight against the Serbs， but soon their military coalition collapsed and they began to switch in the attack to each other. Due to the overwhelming military superiority， the Serbs took control of more than 70% of Bosnian territory， at the cost of around 200， 000 deaths and 2， 000， 000 refugees.
The actions of the Serbs， including secret camps， mass killings， destruction of Muslin architecture， etc.， were prevailingly identified as ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the international media （Paris， 2004：98）. Despite the relevant reports by media， the global community remained more or less indifferent. As one of the most powerful regional organizations involving the intrastate conflict， NATO represented an example in which ‘immediate and long-term strategies are applied simultaneously rather than sequentially’ （Carment and Harvey， 2001：109）. It worked out a detailed plan for its tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina， with a view to ensuring the arms control， political stability， human rights， and reconstruction of the country. In practice， it firstly undertook efforts to contain the scope and intensity of the conflict by virtue of spill over control， containment and coercive diplomacy. For example， on 22 April 1994， NATO announced that if the Bosnian Serbs use heavy weapons within the ‘safe areas’ designated by the UN， these weapons and other related military assets would face the air strikes from NATO （Carment and Harvey， 2001：120）.
Another action attracted much attention was that then-President Bill Clinton issued an ultimatum to the Serbs through the NATO， forcing them to withdraw their artillery from Sarajevo. Soon， the Serbs complied and agreed to a ceasefire in Sarajevo. However， they did not really intend to lay down their weapons， and continued to escalate the intrastate conflict. Eventually， under the leadership of the US， NATO carried out a series of effective military intervention in Bosnia， and the Serb leader had to declare a ceasefire and talk peace. After three weeks of negotiation， the parties reached an agreement for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina， i.e. the Dayton Accord （Paris， 2004：99）. The accord， to a large degree， created a secure and stable environment for a lasting peace. After it was signed， the World Bank， International Monetary Fund， and European Union took joint responsibility for overseeing reconstruction efforts in Bosnia （Paris， 2004：106）. Meanwhile， more and more relevant organizations involved.
The NATO played a crucial role in the entire process of conflict intervention. A host of regional organizations followed its steps to control the deteriorating situation and later made great efforts to reconstruct the Bosnian’s homeland. In fact， the country was lack of capable leaders， strong institutions， and economic resources to guarantee its own security. When its intrastate conflict developed into a large-scale civil war， the world community got the chance to examine their practical capability to mitigate crisis. Furthermore， the Serbs were the initiator of the Bosnia conflict， and their actions of ‘ethnic cleansing’ were denounced broadly in global society， so it was relatively easy for NATO and other organizations to distinguish the oppressor and the oppressed， make fast response to it， and cooperate with each other， which accumulated a cluster of experiences and lessons for future coordination. 3. Rwanda Conflict
Rwanda， a small country in central Africa， is mainly composed of Hutu and Tutsi， and the former takes the overwhelming majority of the total population. During the long colonial period， the Tutsi dominated the country with the support of the Belgian administration. At the end of the 1950s， the Belgian government turned their support from the Tutsi to Hutu， which led to the transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination in the early 1960s. The two social groups have always held a sense of hatred towards each other. As a matter of fact， before the independence of the country， there were numerous conflicts between them.
On April 6， 1994， the president of Rwanda was assassinated when his airplane was shot down， which directly aroused the wave of bloody massacres to the Tutsi. In three months， about one million people were killed， and most of them were the Tutsi. It took the international media nearly three weeks to grasp the magnitude of the genocide in Rwanda （Sellstrom， 1996：52）， where was almost cut off from the outside world in less developed communications.
Actually， before April 6， a large number of prior warnings of the violence were sent to the UN， USA， the Organization of African Unity， and other countries or organizations （Sellstrom， 1996：53）. But it seemed that they didn’t take the warnings seriously， because when the mass killings broke out， they were caught unprepared. From the perspective of an outsider， NATO stands largely on behalf of the interest of the United States in Rwanda conflict. As for the US government， Rwanda is a poor country far from the Untied States， which is of no direct threat or interest to them. Thus， they lack the political will to play an active part in managing， settling or preventing the conflict in Rwanda. Under the huge impact of the US government， the NATO didn’t take any actual reaction to the large-scale massacres in Rwanda.
4. NATO’s Different Reactions to the Two Cases
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a small country in Southeastern Europe. Between 1992 and 1995， the conflict within the state cost about 200， 000 deaths. Rwanda is a small country in central Africa. In three months after the conflict of April 1994， it cost nearly 1， 000， 000 deaths （Sellstrom， 1996：50）. Just from this basic information， one might assume that conflict in Rwanda was far severer than that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and much more attention would have been paid to Rwanda. However， the truth is out of expectation：the international community put greater emphasis on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The NATO’s attitudes toward the two intrastate conflicts were sharply different. It made considerable efforts to actively intervene the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict， and it contributed a lot to the ceasefire of warring parties as well as the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia. Without exaggeration， its reactions to the Bosnia case outweighed the relevant contributions of the UN. By contrast， the regional organization showed indifference to the Rwanda tragedy， and gave no actual reaction to the intense conflict.
5. Conclusion
The essay focuses on the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda， not only for the reason that they cost a large number of deaths， but also because it intends to find the root cause of the different reactions to the conflicts. Through the sharply different performances of NATO in the two cases， it realizes that， in the decision-making process， member states’ interest has been and will be put in the first place by regional organizations. Meanwhile， it notices that even the powerful and influential organization， NATO， cannot react to intrastate conflicts at random. Instead， it should take a series of factors into consideration. Therefore， it has to face opportunities as well as constraints when attempting to deal with intrastate conflicts. In order to solve the intractable problem， NATO should actively cooperate on the basis of putting each actor’s advantage together. Once this possible solution comes true， intrastate conflicts will not be so complicated to tackle.
References：
[1]Carment，D.and Schnabel，A.（eds.）（2004）Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality：Opportunities and Innovations， Lanham：Lexington Books.
[2]Carment，D.and Harvey，F.（2001）Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence：A Evaluation of Theory and Evidence，Westport：Praeger Publisher.
[3]Crockers，C.A.et al.（eds.）（2001）Turbulent Peace：The Challenges of Managing International Conflict，Washington，D.C.：United States Institute of Peace Press.
[4]Diehl，P.F.and Lepgold，J.（eds.）（2003）Regional Conflict Management，Lanham：Rowman
【Key words】NATO； intrastate conflict； military intervention
1. Introduction
It has been proved that， since the end of 1980s， a vast majority of armed conflicts all over the world have been intrastate rather than interstate conflicts. Among a wide range of intrastate conflicts， the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda attract much attention. This essay takes an overview of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict， and soon turns to the reactions NATO （the North Atlantic Treaty Organization）. Then， it intends to explore the role of NATO when it manages， settles， or prevents the intrastate conflicts. A brief introduction of the Rwanda tragedy will be put in the following context. At last， it will do certain comparison concerning the two cases and NATO， so as to find a possible solution for intrastate conflict intervention.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict
Bosnia-Herzegovina， a member state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia， held a referendum on independence in 1992 （Paris， 2004：97）. The three major ethnic groups， the Muslims， Croats， and Serbs， did not reach an agreement on Bosnia’s independence：the first two groups strongly favored it， while the last group intensely opposed it. When the Serbs boycotting the referendum， most of the valid votes were for independence and corresponding resolution was approved （Lobell and Mauceri， 2004：27）. Consequently， the conflict among these groups developed into a civil war. At the beginning， the Croats and Muslims pulled together to fight against the Serbs， but soon their military coalition collapsed and they began to switch in the attack to each other. Due to the overwhelming military superiority， the Serbs took control of more than 70% of Bosnian territory， at the cost of around 200， 000 deaths and 2， 000， 000 refugees.
The actions of the Serbs， including secret camps， mass killings， destruction of Muslin architecture， etc.， were prevailingly identified as ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the international media （Paris， 2004：98）. Despite the relevant reports by media， the global community remained more or less indifferent. As one of the most powerful regional organizations involving the intrastate conflict， NATO represented an example in which ‘immediate and long-term strategies are applied simultaneously rather than sequentially’ （Carment and Harvey， 2001：109）. It worked out a detailed plan for its tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina， with a view to ensuring the arms control， political stability， human rights， and reconstruction of the country. In practice， it firstly undertook efforts to contain the scope and intensity of the conflict by virtue of spill over control， containment and coercive diplomacy. For example， on 22 April 1994， NATO announced that if the Bosnian Serbs use heavy weapons within the ‘safe areas’ designated by the UN， these weapons and other related military assets would face the air strikes from NATO （Carment and Harvey， 2001：120）.
Another action attracted much attention was that then-President Bill Clinton issued an ultimatum to the Serbs through the NATO， forcing them to withdraw their artillery from Sarajevo. Soon， the Serbs complied and agreed to a ceasefire in Sarajevo. However， they did not really intend to lay down their weapons， and continued to escalate the intrastate conflict. Eventually， under the leadership of the US， NATO carried out a series of effective military intervention in Bosnia， and the Serb leader had to declare a ceasefire and talk peace. After three weeks of negotiation， the parties reached an agreement for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina， i.e. the Dayton Accord （Paris， 2004：99）. The accord， to a large degree， created a secure and stable environment for a lasting peace. After it was signed， the World Bank， International Monetary Fund， and European Union took joint responsibility for overseeing reconstruction efforts in Bosnia （Paris， 2004：106）. Meanwhile， more and more relevant organizations involved.
The NATO played a crucial role in the entire process of conflict intervention. A host of regional organizations followed its steps to control the deteriorating situation and later made great efforts to reconstruct the Bosnian’s homeland. In fact， the country was lack of capable leaders， strong institutions， and economic resources to guarantee its own security. When its intrastate conflict developed into a large-scale civil war， the world community got the chance to examine their practical capability to mitigate crisis. Furthermore， the Serbs were the initiator of the Bosnia conflict， and their actions of ‘ethnic cleansing’ were denounced broadly in global society， so it was relatively easy for NATO and other organizations to distinguish the oppressor and the oppressed， make fast response to it， and cooperate with each other， which accumulated a cluster of experiences and lessons for future coordination. 3. Rwanda Conflict
Rwanda， a small country in central Africa， is mainly composed of Hutu and Tutsi， and the former takes the overwhelming majority of the total population. During the long colonial period， the Tutsi dominated the country with the support of the Belgian administration. At the end of the 1950s， the Belgian government turned their support from the Tutsi to Hutu， which led to the transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination in the early 1960s. The two social groups have always held a sense of hatred towards each other. As a matter of fact， before the independence of the country， there were numerous conflicts between them.
On April 6， 1994， the president of Rwanda was assassinated when his airplane was shot down， which directly aroused the wave of bloody massacres to the Tutsi. In three months， about one million people were killed， and most of them were the Tutsi. It took the international media nearly three weeks to grasp the magnitude of the genocide in Rwanda （Sellstrom， 1996：52）， where was almost cut off from the outside world in less developed communications.
Actually， before April 6， a large number of prior warnings of the violence were sent to the UN， USA， the Organization of African Unity， and other countries or organizations （Sellstrom， 1996：53）. But it seemed that they didn’t take the warnings seriously， because when the mass killings broke out， they were caught unprepared. From the perspective of an outsider， NATO stands largely on behalf of the interest of the United States in Rwanda conflict. As for the US government， Rwanda is a poor country far from the Untied States， which is of no direct threat or interest to them. Thus， they lack the political will to play an active part in managing， settling or preventing the conflict in Rwanda. Under the huge impact of the US government， the NATO didn’t take any actual reaction to the large-scale massacres in Rwanda.
4. NATO’s Different Reactions to the Two Cases
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a small country in Southeastern Europe. Between 1992 and 1995， the conflict within the state cost about 200， 000 deaths. Rwanda is a small country in central Africa. In three months after the conflict of April 1994， it cost nearly 1， 000， 000 deaths （Sellstrom， 1996：50）. Just from this basic information， one might assume that conflict in Rwanda was far severer than that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and much more attention would have been paid to Rwanda. However， the truth is out of expectation：the international community put greater emphasis on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The NATO’s attitudes toward the two intrastate conflicts were sharply different. It made considerable efforts to actively intervene the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict， and it contributed a lot to the ceasefire of warring parties as well as the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia. Without exaggeration， its reactions to the Bosnia case outweighed the relevant contributions of the UN. By contrast， the regional organization showed indifference to the Rwanda tragedy， and gave no actual reaction to the intense conflict.
5. Conclusion
The essay focuses on the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda， not only for the reason that they cost a large number of deaths， but also because it intends to find the root cause of the different reactions to the conflicts. Through the sharply different performances of NATO in the two cases， it realizes that， in the decision-making process， member states’ interest has been and will be put in the first place by regional organizations. Meanwhile， it notices that even the powerful and influential organization， NATO， cannot react to intrastate conflicts at random. Instead， it should take a series of factors into consideration. Therefore， it has to face opportunities as well as constraints when attempting to deal with intrastate conflicts. In order to solve the intractable problem， NATO should actively cooperate on the basis of putting each actor’s advantage together. Once this possible solution comes true， intrastate conflicts will not be so complicated to tackle.
References：
[1]Carment，D.and Schnabel，A.（eds.）（2004）Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality：Opportunities and Innovations， Lanham：Lexington Books.
[2]Carment，D.and Harvey，F.（2001）Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence：A Evaluation of Theory and Evidence，Westport：Praeger Publisher.
[3]Crockers，C.A.et al.（eds.）（2001）Turbulent Peace：The Challenges of Managing International Conflict，Washington，D.C.：United States Institute of Peace Press.
[4]Diehl，P.F.and Lepgold，J.（eds.）（2003）Regional Conflict Management，Lanham：Rowman