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康德在《道德形而上学奠基》所说的“目的自身”首要的是一个规范性的概念,而不是如奥尼尔·森森在其《康德论人的尊严》所宣称的是一个描述性的概念。森森正确地论证,尊严不是一个表达某种模糊的属性之价值的概念。但是他不承认,尊严的基础在于与我们自己的一种关系,其中,我们作为意志的主体规定自己。虽然尊严不是道德律约束我们的理由,但是它对我们理解康德责任的概念尤其重要。尊严标志着自由和自由法则对自然法则在规范性上的优先性。
As Kant refers to in his foundation of moral metaphysics, “purpose itself” is primarily a normative concept, not a descriptive concept as O’Neill Sensen proclaimed in his “Kant on Human Dignity.” Sensen rightly argues that dignity is not a concept of the value of a vague attribute. But he does not admit that the foundation of dignity lies in a relationship with ourselves, in which we define ourselves as the subject of will. Although dignity is not the moral law that binds us, it is especially important for us to understand the concept of Kant’s responsibility. Dignity marked the normative priority of the laws of nature by the law of liberty and freedom.