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我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态,大股东与潜在投资者之间 严重的信息不对称导致了大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余操纵动机。 本文建立了一个模型来分析大股东进行盈余操纵的机理,大股东通过调整利润的时 间分布可以改变投资者对上市公司盈利能力和投资价值的判断,从而造成股票再发 行价格的提升,使大股东获取更多的私人利益。存在盈余操纵成本的情况下,只要 盈余操纵的边际收益大于边际成本,实施盈余操纵就是大股东的最优选择,从而使 盈余操纵成为上市公司股权再融资过程中的普遍现象。
The listed companies in our country are under the super-control status of major shareholders, and the serious information asymmetry between major shareholders and potential investors leads to the major shareholders’ motivation of earnings manipulation in the course of equity refinancing. This paper establishes a model to analyze the mechanism of large shareholders ’earnings manipulation. Large shareholders can change the time distribution of profits to change investors’ judgment on the profitability and investment value of listed companies, resulting in the increase of the price of reissue, Get more private benefits. Under the circumstance of earnings manipulation costs, as long as the marginal revenue of earnings manipulation is greater than the marginal cost, the implementation of earnings manipulation is the optimal choice of major shareholders, so that earnings manipulation becomes a common phenomenon in the process of equity refinancing of listed companies.