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我们通过研究独立的成本类型,分析了产品市场竞争对一级密封价格拍卖和英国式拍卖的影响。投标人基干在第一阶段许可证博弈和在产品市场中他们可能的博弈中信息的披露情况对许可证估价,他们不仅关心能否赢得拍卖和出价多少,并且关心当他们赢得拍卖后信息的披露情况。在英国式拍卖过程中,所有的应买者都能够不断地调整他们对潜在对手的成本分布的信仰。潜在对手出价越高,他的成本越低,中标的期望报酬也越低,从而,投标人将会降低许可证的估价,并且会更保守地出价。政府从英国式拍卖中获得的期望收益比一级密封价格拍卖要低。特别地,如果政府采用英国式拍卖方式,而产品市场中采用伯川德削价博弈策略,那么,所有的投标人期望两个最低成本类型的投标人将退出出价博弈,期望收益降为零。更进一步说,由于伯川德竞争比古诺竞争激烈,当产品市场以伯川德模型进行博弈时,政府期望收益更低。
By studying the independent types of costs, we analyze the impact of product market competition on first-tier sealed price auctions and British-style auctions. The bidder’s base estimates the license in the first phase of the licensing game and the disclosure of information in their possible games in the product market. They are concerned not only with the ability to win the auction and the bid, but also with the disclosure of the information when they win the auction Happening. In the British auction process, all buyers are constantly able to adjust their belief in the cost distribution of potential adversaries. The higher the potential opponent’s bid, the lower his cost, and the lower the expected bid, the bidder will lower the valuation of the permit and will bid more conservatively. The government’s expected return from British auctions is lower than the first-price sealed auction. In particular, if the government adopts the British auction method and Bertrand’s game strategy is adopted in the product market, all bidders expect bidders of the two lowest cost types to withdraw from the bidding game and expect the return to be zero. Furthermore, because Berthold competition is fiercely competitive with Cournot, the government expected lower returns when the product market was berthing with the Bertrand model.