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本文以2005—2008年的952家沪深上市公司数据为样本,对总经理团队变更和多元化经营进行了实证研究,结果表明:总经理团队变更对本年度多元化经营有显著地正向影响,对下一年度的多元化经营没有影响,这说明总经理团队变更对多元化经营的正向影响是短暂性冲击,而非持续性决策;多元化经营虽然改善了短期治理绩效,但却极大损害了长期治理绩效;多元化经营对高管薪酬没有显著的正向影响,影响高管薪酬的仍是以ROA为核心要素的治理绩效。总经理团队变更对多元化经营的短期强化效应,损害了公司利益却无助于增加高管私利,相对管理者自利而言,继任事件所诱发的管理者过度自信对这一现象更富有解释力。
Based on the data of 952 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2005 to 2008, this paper conducts an empirical study on the change of general manager team and diversification. The results show that the change of general manager team has a significant positive impact on the diversification of the current year, Which has no effect on the diversification of the next fiscal year. This shows that the positive influence of the change of the general manager team on the diversification is a transient rather than a continuous decision. Although diversification improves the performance of short-term governance, it is extremely significant Which has undermined long-term governance performance. Diversification has no significant positive impact on executive compensation, and the impact of executive compensation is still governance performance with ROA as the core factor. General manager team changes to the diversification of the short-term reinforcement effect, damage the interests of the company but it does not help to increase self-interest executives, relative to managers self-interest, successor incite managers overconfidence of this phenomenon more explained force.