论文部分内容阅读
本文构建了一个程式化的出口导向型经济模型。我们研究了宏观经济政策对汇率、通货膨胀、产出和稳定金的动态影响,并考虑了不同形式下政府和央行之间的战略互动。结果显示,央行的自主性并没有起到决定性的作用;当政府主导与合作时,在斯塔克伯格(Stackelberg)博弈下实现财政政策和货币政策的有效互动是可行的。我们认为2001～2007年,俄罗斯采取的是紧缩的财政政策与极度宽松的货币政策。我们的分析显示出这个政策组合并非最优:央行与政府同时选择适度的扩张性政策社会损失会更小。
This article builds a stylized export-oriented economy model. We studied the dynamic effects of macroeconomic policies on exchange rates, inflation, output and stability and considered the strategic interactions between the government and the central bank under different forms. The results show that the central bank’s autonomy did not play a decisive role. When the government dominates and cooperates, it is feasible to implement the effective interaction of fiscal policy and monetary policy under the Stackelberg game. We think that from 2001 to 2007, Russia adopted a tightening fiscal policy and an extremely loose monetary policy. Our analysis shows that this combination of policies is not optimal: the central bank and the government choose a modest expansionary policy with less social loss.