公共部门HR风险探析 根据经济学中的理性经济人假设,人是自利的,其行为表现为趋利避害,而给公共部门带来风险的是组织内部人员的“利”、“害”不一定与组织自身的“利”、“害”完全重合,这样就造成了对公共部门人员采取的行动难以预测,对组织,乃至对于社会福利的影响难以预测。进一步从委托代理理论的角度看,公共部门与公共部门人员所掌握 According to the hypothesis of rational economic man in economics, people are self-interested and behave in the form of profit and avoidance. The risk to the public sector is the “profit” and “harm” of the internal staff. It does not necessarily coincide with the “profitability” and “harm” of the organization itself. This results in unpredictable actions on public sector personnel and unpredictable effects on the organization and even on social welfare. Further from the perspective of principal-agent theory, the public sector and public sector personnel