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本文从委托代理问题的相互性出发,围绕代理净收益及其分割提出委托人方面的问题,即委托人也有可能损害代理人利益或委托代理行为。指出“所有者行为障碍”命题的误导,认为普遍存在的委托人问题构成国有经济中严重代理问题的主要方面,并着重分析了初始委托人让渡委托权的内在逻辑。关注委托人问题,有助于较恰当地讨论与改进国有经济中的问题。
This paper, based on the mutual relationship between principal-agent problems, puts forward the problems of the principal around the agent's net income and its division, that is, the principal may also damage the agent's interests or agency acts. It points out the misleading of the proposition of “owner behavior disorder”, considers the ubiquitous principal problem as the main aspect of the serious agent problem in the state-owned economy, and emphatically analyzes the internal logic of the initial principal assignment. Concerned about the principal issues, help to more properly discuss and improve the state-owned economy.