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1.企业在产权改革中的甩债行为与银行资产风险管理的矛盾。当前部分企业在产权改革中存在着严重的甩债行为,大致有以下几种情形:一是逃避银行债务。某些企业被兼并、拍卖、租赁之后,新的企业法人不承认银行债务,与原银行断绝往来,有的企业为逃避银行债务甚至进行假破产、假兼并。二是转移银行债务。某些企业在改制中直接或间接将贷款形成的资产投资入股,使银行贷款变为企业长期垫付的资产而无法收回。三是虚置银行债权。某些系统管理的企业,采取“债务一家背,解放一大批”的变通办法由空壳的主管部门负债,银行债权形同虚设。
1. The contradiction between the behavior of debt repayment and the risk management of bank assets in the property rights reform. At present, some enterprises have serious debt-fighting behaviors in property rights reforms. There are roughly the following situations: First, evade bank debts. After some enterprises were merged, auctioned, and leased, new corporate entities did not recognize bank debts and cut off contacts with the original banks. Some companies evaded bank debts and even made false bankruptcies and false mergers. The second is the transfer of bank debt. Some enterprises directly or indirectly invest the assets formed by the loans into shares during the restructuring process, making bank loans become long-term advance assets of the company and cannot be recovered. The third is to leave bank credits in a virtual position. Some system-managed enterprises adopt the alternative method of “debts on one side and a large number of liberations” and are indebted by the competent departments of the shells, and bank claims are virtually null and void.