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【Abstract】Understanding， as a controversial philosophical concept left over for years， seems to be obscure， both conceptually and ideologically， to shed its veils. Compared with its scope of application， it is the very idea， or to say， definition that is the most ambiguous section that we ought to engage with. In the thesis， not only the interpretation of the concept of understanding of Wittgenstein’s by a few philosophers is listed but also my own perspective towards the review of the above-mentioned philosophers as well as some disputable points of understanding is offered.
【Key words】language-game； understanding； Wittgenstein
1. Understanding is not particular progress
As John McDowell in his paper Are meaning， understanding， etc. Definite states？ states， ‘Wittgenstein…meant to persuade us that， in some sense， understanding， believing， remembering， thinking， and the like are not particular or definite states or processes’. But in what sense should one do that？ It is undeniable that ‘we may speak of a state of understanding， or of thought progress’ （Goldfarb 1992： 109）. When one understands， or at least one thinks that his or she understands， one is surely in a state of understanding. However， this is not all what Wittgenstein means — when one understands the rule of playing basketball， is it proper to say he understands the rule of playing sports？ Definitely NOT. One can never apply a narrow sense on a broad notion， in case that it is only the substituent part of it.
According to the review of McDowell to Goldfarb， only the above-mentioned statement can be regard as an admitted one. ‘He devotes the rest of it to elaborating how he reads the passages in which Wittgenstein discourages us from thinking in terms of definite or particular states and processes’ （McDowell 2010： 162）. This appearance comes to nothing on the basic acknowledgment that Wittgenstein has nothing against such talk.
2. Confusion caused by understanding as a mental process
Goldfarb supports the explicit statement by Wittgenstein of saying， ‘Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. — For that is the expression that confuses you’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 163）. It seems obviously that Wittgenstein discourage the thinking of understanding as a mental state. If someone utters a words， then if one knows it， one grasps the meaning of a word at a stroke. Then how can this definite moment be considered as mental process or mental occurrences？ Absolutely is it ridiculous. One use ones ‘state of an apparatus of the mind （perhaps a state of the brain）’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 64） to understanding something， say， a very classic example of Wittgenstein， a number series. Wittgenstein puts such a state as a disposition. Nevertheless， a state of mind here can also be confusing， since one must distinguish the correct criteria of a two： the structure of the brain and the effect of the brain. What should be especially mentioned here is that， according to Wittgenstein， ‘nothing would be more confusing here to use the words ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ for the contrast between a state of consciousness and a disposition’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 64）. The reason might be that these two words are not at the same grammatical level. One is tempted to put on this thought by the figure above： ‘To have got the system （or again， to understand it） cannot consist in continuing the series up to this or that number： that is only applying one’s understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 63）. Let’s go back to the example of the number series. If A writes down ‘1， 3， 5， 7...’， can I say that if B can continue up to the 100th， 200th， or even 500th place？ What’s more， there is no specific limit to the numbers the pupil must write down to qualify as having grasped the rule of the series. Thus the confusion lies in here： one is always tempted to regard applying one’s understanding as understanding of the whole entire system.
3. Conclusion
When one understands a word， he or she is definitely in a particular state. But the very idea of understanding can be， according to Wittgenstein， in some sense not a particular state and in some sense a definite one. If one really wants to understand， one has to go to the outer sphere， which naturally connects with the background， situation， etc. For those who only pursue a basic understanding， then textual details should be figured out grammatically.
References：
[1]Goldfarb，W.，1992，‘Wittgenstein on understanding’，Midwest Studies In Philosophy，109-22.
[2]McDowell，J.2009，‘Are Meaning，Understanding，etc.，Definite States’，in Arif Ahmed（ed.），Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations，Cambridge University Press，Cambridge，162–77.
[3]Wittgenstein，L.，2001，Philosophical investigations，Blackwell，Oxford，（Original work published 1953）.
【Key words】language-game； understanding； Wittgenstein
1. Understanding is not particular progress
As John McDowell in his paper Are meaning， understanding， etc. Definite states？ states， ‘Wittgenstein…meant to persuade us that， in some sense， understanding， believing， remembering， thinking， and the like are not particular or definite states or processes’. But in what sense should one do that？ It is undeniable that ‘we may speak of a state of understanding， or of thought progress’ （Goldfarb 1992： 109）. When one understands， or at least one thinks that his or she understands， one is surely in a state of understanding. However， this is not all what Wittgenstein means — when one understands the rule of playing basketball， is it proper to say he understands the rule of playing sports？ Definitely NOT. One can never apply a narrow sense on a broad notion， in case that it is only the substituent part of it.
According to the review of McDowell to Goldfarb， only the above-mentioned statement can be regard as an admitted one. ‘He devotes the rest of it to elaborating how he reads the passages in which Wittgenstein discourages us from thinking in terms of definite or particular states and processes’ （McDowell 2010： 162）. This appearance comes to nothing on the basic acknowledgment that Wittgenstein has nothing against such talk.
2. Confusion caused by understanding as a mental process
Goldfarb supports the explicit statement by Wittgenstein of saying， ‘Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. — For that is the expression that confuses you’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 163）. It seems obviously that Wittgenstein discourage the thinking of understanding as a mental state. If someone utters a words， then if one knows it， one grasps the meaning of a word at a stroke. Then how can this definite moment be considered as mental process or mental occurrences？ Absolutely is it ridiculous. One use ones ‘state of an apparatus of the mind （perhaps a state of the brain）’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 64） to understanding something， say， a very classic example of Wittgenstein， a number series. Wittgenstein puts such a state as a disposition. Nevertheless， a state of mind here can also be confusing， since one must distinguish the correct criteria of a two： the structure of the brain and the effect of the brain. What should be especially mentioned here is that， according to Wittgenstein， ‘nothing would be more confusing here to use the words ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ for the contrast between a state of consciousness and a disposition’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 64）. The reason might be that these two words are not at the same grammatical level. One is tempted to put on this thought by the figure above： ‘To have got the system （or again， to understand it） cannot consist in continuing the series up to this or that number： that is only applying one’s understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use’ （Wittgenstein 2009： 63）. Let’s go back to the example of the number series. If A writes down ‘1， 3， 5， 7...’， can I say that if B can continue up to the 100th， 200th， or even 500th place？ What’s more， there is no specific limit to the numbers the pupil must write down to qualify as having grasped the rule of the series. Thus the confusion lies in here： one is always tempted to regard applying one’s understanding as understanding of the whole entire system.
3. Conclusion
When one understands a word， he or she is definitely in a particular state. But the very idea of understanding can be， according to Wittgenstein， in some sense not a particular state and in some sense a definite one. If one really wants to understand， one has to go to the outer sphere， which naturally connects with the background， situation， etc. For those who only pursue a basic understanding， then textual details should be figured out grammatically.
References：
[1]Goldfarb，W.，1992，‘Wittgenstein on understanding’，Midwest Studies In Philosophy，109-22.
[2]McDowell，J.2009，‘Are Meaning，Understanding，etc.，Definite States’，in Arif Ahmed（ed.），Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations，Cambridge University Press，Cambridge，162–77.
[3]Wittgenstein，L.，2001，Philosophical investigations，Blackwell，Oxford，（Original work published 1953）.