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在过去十年里,城镇化是中国一项影响深远的公共政策,不仅塑造了新型的城乡关系,也极大地塑造了基层政府行为。乡镇政府在执行城镇化政策的时候,会呈现极端行为,即汲取的和包容的。县乡财政关系以及县级政府对土地财政依赖度是造成两种极端行为模式的关键原因。两种不同的城镇化模式在农民中间带来了相似的后果,农民对集中居住表现出不同程度的不满。因此,在推行农民集中居住的政策过程中,抑制基层政府非理性行为的有效措施是调整政绩激励机制的指标与结构,同时,用制度化的方式确保农民参与此项政策的基本权利,建立农民与政府之间的合作关系。
In the past ten years, urbanization has become a far-reaching public policy in China. It has not only shaped a new type of urban-rural relations, but also greatly shaped the behavior of grassroots government. When implementing the urbanization policy, the township government will show extreme behavior, that is, absorption and tolerance. The county-township financial relations and the county-level government’s financial dependence on land are the two major causes of extreme patterns of behavior. Two different models of urbanization have similar consequences among peasants, and peasants have shown varying degrees of dissatisfaction with concentrated residence. Therefore, in the process of implementing the policy of collective residence of peasants, effective measures to curb the irrational behavior of the grassroots government are to adjust the index and structure of the political incentive mechanism, and at the same time, institutionalize the basic rights of peasants to participate in this policy and establish peasants Cooperation with the government.