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基于一种比较法视野,本文对美、法、德等国的重整制度进行了简要考察,并运用法律经济学的基本逻辑和思想,从信息和风险的角度讨论了决定重整制度是否有效的几个制约条件,总结出一个简单的重整制度有效性规律。以此标准考察,由于欠缺拥有较高司法能力和良好职业操守的法院系统,忽略债权人自治、缺少促进重整过程中有效信息交流的现行法律规则可能会催发更多的司法腐败并激发债务人更多的机会主义行为。
Based on a comparative field of vision, this article briefly reviews the restructuring of the United States, France and Germany. By using the basic logic and ideology of law and economics, this paper discusses the validity of the reform and reorganization system from the perspective of information and risk Several constraints, summed up a simple law of validity of the reform system. As a result of this criterion, the lack of existing court systems with high judicial capacity and good professional ethics neglects the autonomy of creditors and the lack of existing legal rules that facilitate the effective exchange of information in the process of reorganization may prompt more judicial corruption and stimulate more debtors More opportunistic behavior.