道德风险一直被认为是导致金融危机的重要原因。通过将控制权私人收益引入到动态资产定价模型中,在考虑财务危机成本的基础上,构建了金融高管的风险选择决策函数。基于数字算例和实证分析,私人收益的存在导致了金融高管选择远高于股东最优的风险水平。这说明约束高管过度冒险行为的最有效方法是对控制权私人收益进行限制。 Moral hazard has long been considered as an important cause of the financial crisis. By introducing the private benefits of control into the dynamic asset pricing model, the risk selection decision function of financial executives is constructed on the basis of considering the financial crisis cost. Based on numerical examples and empirical analysis, the existence of private benefits has led to the selection of financial executives far above the optimal level of risk for shareholders. This shows that the most effective way to constrain the excessive risk-taking of senior management is to limit the private benefits of control.