以外包商为参考点,针对研发外包中承包商同时存在信息泄露和隐藏努力程度的两类道德风险问题,运用委托代理理论,建立了考虑知识产权权属分配模式的研发外包激励机制。研究表明,在允许知识产权许可的情况下,将知识产权所有权授权给承包商,不但会增加外包商的期望收益,还可以有效激励承包商最优努力水平,同时避免其信息泄露问题。 Taking the outsourcers as reference points, this paper uses the principal-agent theory to establish a R & D outsourcing incentive mechanism that considers the distribution mode of intellectual property ownership. In this paper, contractors in R & D outsourcing have two types of moral hazard problems: information disclosure and concealment efforts. Research shows that delegating intellectual property ownership to contractors while permitting intellectual property permits not only increases the outsourcer’s expected return, but also effectively stimulates the contractor’s optimal level of effort while avoiding the issue of information leakage.