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生态现象学有助于我们应对当前的环境危机,因为它可以根除那种源于西方现代哲学的伦理和形而上学预设——这种预设正是我们现在心安理得地破坏环境的理论根据。伴随着生态现象学运动,两种相互抗衡的立场依稀可辨:尼采和胡塞尔的追随者们倡导一种自然伦理实在论,认为价值应该建立在伦理事实的基础之上;而海德格尔和列维纳斯的支持者们则阐明了一种先验的伦理实在论,他们认为:亲近自然所得到的真正重要的东西,并不能被还原为事实或价值等任何形式的实体。这两种伦理实在论造成了两种不同的伦理完美主义:前者屈从于以生态为中心的完满性,它强调所有生命的繁荣共生;而后者则指向了一种更加“人性化”的完美主义,侧重于培养“此在”的独特特征。在检视了上述两种立场之后,我们更愿意捍卫海德格尔式的、更富人性化的立场,因为它更接近于以生态为中心的视角中那些最佳的要素,同时避免了问题重重的本体论预设与反人文的含义。
Eco-phenomenology helps us to cope with the current environmental crisis because it eradicates the ethical and metaphysical presuppositions derived from Western modern philosophy - the presuppositions that underlie our theoretical rationale for savagely destroying the environment. With the movement of ecological phenomenology, two kinds of countervailing positions are vaguely discernible: followers of Nietzsche and Husserl advocate a kind of natural ethics realism, believing that value should be based on ethical facts; and that Heidegger Proponents of Levinas shed light on transcendental ethical realism, which argues that what really matters in close proximity to nature can not be reduced to any form of reality, such as fact or value. These two kinds of ethical realism lead to two different kinds of ethical perfectionism: the former succumbs to the ecological-centered perfection, which emphasizes the prosperity and symbiosis of all life while the latter points to a more “humanized” Perfectionism, focusing on cultivating the unique characteristics of “this is where”. Having looked at both of these positions, we prefer to defend the Heidegger-based, more humane position as it is closer to the best elements of the ecologically-focused perspective and avoids the problematic Ontological presuppositions and antihuman meanings.