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公有产权的政府代理在市场竞争环境下必然是低效率的,但它不是公有制的必然选择。国企改革可以通过建立以资产保值增值为唯一目的的社会信托投资基金,割断政府与国有资产的产权代理链,从而实现资产管理“去政府化”的改革目标。承认这一改革思路的可能性将对当前国企改革的大政方针及对中国经济体制改革的演化路径均产生重大影响。
The government agency of public property must be inefficient in the market competition environment, but it is not the inevitable choice of public ownership. The reform of state-owned enterprises can cut off the chain of property rights between the government and state-owned assets through the establishment of a social trust investment fund with the sole purpose of preserving and increasing the value of assets, so as to achieve the reform goal of asset management and government de-government. The possibility of admitting this reform mentality will have a significant impact on the major policies and guidelines for the current reform of state-owned enterprises and on the evolutionary path of China’s economic reform.