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报酬激励与解职风险是锦标赛机制的激励来源,对输赢家的风险调整行为存在方向相反的激励作用。而股市表现和股市强度与报酬激励、解职风险的相对强度紧密相关,可以作为锦标赛理论预测的重要外生变量。本文以2006—2012年开放式基金为样本,发现输赢家的预期风险调整因股市表现而不同,其排名-风险调整敏感性与市场强度显著正相关,牛(熊)市特征越强则输(赢)家的预期风险调整越大(小)。基金经理通常面临风险限制,上半期意外风险对预期风险产生负向影响,且该影响还取决于意外风险的偏差方向,基金经理的预期风险调整仅对正的意外风险做出反应。此外,经理任职年限对不同股市表现中的排名与预期风险调整关系也存在交互影响。
Reward incentive and dismissal risk are the sources of incentive for the championship mechanism, and there is incentive in opposite directions for the risk adjustment of the winner and the winner. However, stock market performance is closely related to stock market strength and the relative intensity of remuneration incentives and dismissal risks, which can be used as an important exogenous variable for the prediction of championship theories. This paper takes the 2006-2012 open-end fund as a sample and finds that the expected risk adjustment of winners and losers differs according to the performance of the stock market. The ranking-risk adjustment sensitivity has a significant positive correlation with the market strength. The stronger the characteristics of the bear market, Win) the greater the expected risk adjustment for the family (small). Fund managers usually face risk limits. In the first half of the year, unexpected risks have a negative impact on expected risks, and the impact depends on the direction of unexpected risks. The expected risk adjustment of fund managers only responds to positive unexpected risks. In addition, the manager’s tenure of life on the performance of different stocks in the ranking and the expected risk adjustment relationship also exists interaction.