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本文通过完全信息的stackelberg动态博弈模型,分析了领导企业与追随企业之间五种不同的横向兼并模式。研究认为领导企业兼并追随企业、追随企业兼并追随企业后成为领导企业两种横向兼并具有普遍动机;而领导企业兼并领导企业、追随企业兼并领导企业以及追随企业兼并追随企业后仍为追随企业三种横向兼并在一般情况下没有兼并动机。此外在一定条件下,追随企业兼并追随企业后成为领导企业的兼并致使社会总福利增加,而其余所有企业横向兼并均损害了消费者利益,并且导致社会总福利的减少。
This paper analyzes the five different modes of horizontal mergers between leading and following firms through the full information stackelberg dynamic game model. It is generally motivated that the leading firms should follow the merger and follow the merger and become the leading firm following the merger and acquisition of the two firms. It is generally motivated for the leading firms to merge with the leading firms, follow the mergers and acquisitions and follow the mergers and acquisitions. Horizontal merger under normal circumstances there is no incentive to merge. In addition, under certain conditions, the merger of leading enterprises following the merger of enterprises follows the increase of the total welfare of the society, while the horizontal mergers of the remaining enterprises all harm the consumers and lead to the decrease of the total social welfare.