“自由现金流量假说”研究的是现金资源的代理成本问题,它认为低成长的公司容易将现金资源浪费于各种费用的低效使用或管理者的在职消费,所以这些企业把持大量现金资源具有较高的代理成本。针对这一问题,本文以2001年深市上市公司为样本,研究这些公司管理费用的使用状况,验证了自由现金流量代理成本的存在。结果表明,自由现金流量代理成本问题严重的上市公司管理费用的使用效率低下,但负债对此没有明显的控制效应。 The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis examines the agency cost of cash resources, which see low-growth companies easily wasting their cash resources from inefficient use of various fees or on-the-job consumption by managers, so they hold large amounts of cash Resources have high agency costs. In response to this problem, this paper takes the Shenzhen listed companies in 2001 as a sample to study the use of these companies' management fees and verify the existence of free cash flow agency costs. The results show that the management costs of listed companies with serious problems of free cash flow agency costs are inefficient, but the liabilities have no obvious control effect on them.