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本文应用信息经济学中,信息不对称条件下的理性经济人市场博弈行为及影响为基本模型,结合审计服务这一商品必须以一定审计质量为基础这一特点,考虑审计市场中不同审计服务需求者不同的审计风险承担能力,把审计服务商品需求者根据风险承担能力细分为高、中、低三种水平层次,分析了在审计市场信息不对称的情况下,仅依靠市场本身的运作必然会造成审计市场中审计质量不断下降的情况,带来巨大的社会成本,提出要用非市场力量主导实行会计师事务所信用评级制度,提高市场透明度。
This article applies the game theory and game theory of rational economic man under the condition of information asymmetry as the basic model in information economics. Considering the characteristic that auditing service should be based on certain auditing quality, we consider the different auditing service requirements Different auditing risk appetite ability to audit the demand for goods according to the risk appetite of the ability to subdivide into three levels of high, medium and low levels of analysis of the audit market information asymmetry, the reliance on the operation of the market itself is bound to Will result in a continuous decline in audit quality in the audit market, resulting in huge social costs. It is proposed that the credit rating system of accounting firms should be led by non-market forces so as to enhance market transparency.