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中国国有企业的改革是从“放权让利”开始的。扩大企业的自主权,增加企业留利,减少政府对企业的行政命令,给企业以尽可能广阔的运行空间的改革给企业带来了活力,也带来了问题:企业出现了行为短期化、行为不规则等问题。于是就产生了对“扩大企业自主权”的一些质疑,这些质疑归纳起来大致有三个方面:(1)改革迄今,国有企业获得的自主权是不是过大了?(2)如何评价自主权对企业运行的影响?(3)如何评价自主权与企业效率的关系?针对这些问题,本文将对1987年中国国有工业企业403家样本的相关资料进行实证分析,以期在一定程度上解答这些问题。本文首先确定到1987年为止,国有工业企业究竟拥有哪些自主权,其次把企业分为自主权大和小两类,观察自主权大小不同的企业在运行过程(主要是市场行为方面)中有什么不同,再次判定企业自主权的大小与运行效率之间的关系,最后对以上实证分析的结果进行简要的评价。
The reform of state-owned enterprises in China began with “decentralization and profit-sharing”. Expanding the autonomy of enterprises, increasing the profitability of enterprises, reducing government-to-business administrative orders, and giving enterprises the most extensive operating space reforms have brought vitality to enterprises and brought problems. Irregularities and other issues. As a result, there have been some doubts about the “enlargement of enterprise autonomy”. These questions have been summed up in three general terms: (1) Has the reform so far led to state-owned enterprises acquiring too much autonomy? (2) How to evaluate autonomy (3) How to evaluate the relationship between autonomy and corporate efficiency? To address these issues, this paper will empirically analyze the relevant data of 403 Chinese state-owned industrial companies in 1987 in order to answer these questions to some extent. This article first determines the ownership of state-owned industrial enterprises as of 1987, and then divides them into large and small categories of autonomy. Observe the differences in the operation process (mainly market behavior) of enterprises with different autonomy sizes. Again, determine the relationship between the size of the autonomy of the enterprise and the operating efficiency. Finally, briefly evaluate the results of the above empirical analysis.